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1 Introduction 
The Prisoners' Dilemma represents social situations characterized by the 
existence of what is commonly known as the free rider problem. Let us 
consider two examples from the author's hometown. The city of Calcutta is 
renowned in India for Durga Puja, a religious festival during the month of 
October. There is hardly any corner of the city without a pandel (a Ben-
gali term for a temporary tent-like construction) with idols of Durga the 
mother goddess, and her entire family. The festival is financed by collecting 
private donations from households of respective neighborhoods. Over the 
years, more and more Calcuttans have voluntarily contributed successively 
higher donations. On the other hand, the city is also renowned (and this 
time all over the world) for her neglected streets and localities. Some local 
private organizations have made efforts to collect private donations from 
member families of respective neighborhoods for the maintenance of their 
localities. Such efforts have repeatedly failed in most of the neighborhoods 
where such organizational efforts had been taken. Some cases showed com-
plete failure from the very beginning while others eventually ceased to exist 
as the number of private contributors became negligible over time. When 
asked individually however, every citizen of Calcutta showed great concern 
and enthusiasm regarding the cleanliness of their localities. 
These two social situations, the likes of which are surely widespread, can 
be represented by a model of infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma where 
at each period players decide whether or not to contribute for a public good. 
\Vhat is surprising is that while in the former we see that agents cooperate 
and achieve the Pareto dominant outcome (and the festival of Durga Puja is 
celebrated with great enthusiasm), in the latter the same agents behave as 
predicted by the static Nash equilibrium (and Calcutta remains neglected 
forever). Do we have a unified theory that is able to explain this difference in 
social behavior? To have one we need to be able to distinguish one Prisoners' 
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Dilemma from another. Is the Prisoners' Dilemma representing the former 
example different from the one representing the latter? 
As we will argue, a large part of the existing literature on repeated games 
does not answer this question. Nevertheless, since cooperative behavior is 
observed quite often, many authors have tried to explain convergence to 
such Pareto dominant outcomes in similar settings. The general intuition 
has been that when players are rational and sufficiently patient, almost 
any feasible payoff allocation that gives each player at least his minimum 
security level can be realized in an equilibrium of any repeated game. In 
the game theory literature, these feasibility theorems have been referred to 
as folk theorems. Naturally, the predictive power of these results is rather 
weak. Neyman (1985) shows that bounded complexity on part of the players 
justifies cooperation in finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Recently, the 
literature has taken a turn towards modeling ways by which players may 
actually learn to play games and see if such learning behaviors indeed lead 
to some equilibrium or stationary state. 1 
However, as mentioned before, most of these models are not sufficient in 
answering why the same group of players may in some Prisoners' Dilemma 
converge to cooperative behavior while in some other to the Nash equilib-
rium. One may build up a model with two stationary long run outcomes, 
one where players cooperate and the other where players defect and conclude 
that such a diversity is a matter of chance and the evolution of play. We do 
not think this approach is satisfactory in answering our question. Given a 
specified behavior rule, we need a theory that is able to classify Prisoners' 
1 Bendor et al. (1995) show that if both players are aspiration driven and aspirations are 
static, players may exhibit long run cooperative behavior under certain initial conditions. 
Karandikar et al. (1997) show that with evolving aspirations, players will cooperate most 
of the time in a large class of games which includes the Prisoners' Dilemma. Kim (1994) 
studies a satisficing model oflearning where a 2 x 2 game is repeated by case-based players a 
la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1992) and shows that infrequent and simultaneous experiments 
with cooperative strategies are essential for convergence to cooperative behavior in the 
Prisoners' Dilemma. 
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Dilemmas into groups in terms of observable variables and show that play-
ers converge to cooperation with probability one in all Prisoners' Dilemmas 
falling in one such group while they converge with probability one to the 
static Nash equilibrium in all Prisoners' Dilemmas falling in the other. 
In order to resolve this apparent puzzle, we study infinite repetition 
of a class of games ( our initial and fundamental analysis is however kept 
general) which all have the basic essence of the Prisoners' Dilemma that 
ensures existence of the free rider problem as cited in the examples above. 
Players are assumed to learn to play the game over time from past expe-
rience. The learning model used by players is a variant of logistic quantal 
response learning (LQRL) a la McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). We assume 
that players have cognitive bounds in analyzing histories of past plays in 
order to decide upon their current choice probabilities. We call this learn-
ing mechanism bounded logistic quantal response learning (BLQRL). Our 
model captures the fact that players cannot always look very long in the 
past if the past is also very heterogenous and therefore (we call) cognitively 
complex.2 The notion of complexity used in this paper is backward looking 
and is close to the basic idea of finite memory. However, we justify it for 
two reasons. Firstly, players forget distant past. In addition, the rate at 
which they forget the past increases with the heterogeneity of realized his-
tory. This implies that players not only have finite memory but the length 
of their memory evolves probabilistically, conditional on future realization of 
actions which carve the path of play, thus making the length of their memory 
path dependent. Furthermore, players are parameterized by their degree of 
rationality in deciding upon the choice probabilities. McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1995) show that in any finite game where players use the quantal response 
lOur notion of complexity in decision making differs significantly from that of im-
plementational complexity and finite automata as in Kalai and Stanford (1989) or Bin-
more and Samuelson (1992), among others, which is typically forward looking and can be 
roughly thought of as equal to the number of states that a repeated game strategy can 
induce. 
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learning, play converges to a Nash equilibrium when this rationality parame-
ter approaches infinity. Thus in our model we expect play to converge to the 
Nash equilibrium when complexity bounds and the rationality parameter go 
to infinity as essentially then the two models are equivalent. We show that 
(i) if players face cognitive bounds, for any finite stage game, play converges 
to stationary probabilities on the space of action profiles for all values of the 
rationality parameter; (ii) in addition, for the Prisoners' Dilemma, when the 
rationality parameter approaches infinity, play converges to the Nash defect 
with probability one if the weighted average defecting payoff is higher than 
the cooperative one and the weighted average cooperative payoff is lower 
than the defecting one, where the weights are determined by players' beliefs 
regarding outcomes without experience. However, if the reverse is true, that 
is if the weighted average defecting payoff is lower than that of cooperation 
and the weighted average cooperative payoff is higher than that of defec-
tion (which is possible in some class of Prisoners' Dilemma games), play 
converges to cooperative outcome with probability one. 
We then apply the general results to study long run behavior in a large 
class of 2 x 2 games which includes Pure Coordination, Common Interest, 
and Chicken. Our results call for experiments where subjects play 2 x 2 
games studied in this paper and satisfying restrictions as demanded by the 
theory provided. One easy way of capturing and controlling the notion of 
cognitive bounds in such an experimental setup could be to impose time 
restrictions within which subjects need to decide upon their current actions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formally 
state the model. In section 3 we analyze exclusively the issues regarding 
memory and information sets, establishing some properties of an appropriate 
stochastic process which help us prove the two convergence results in section 
4. Section 5 uses these convergence results in selecting out unique long run 
outcomes in Prisoners' Dilemmas under appropriate payoff restrictions and 
suggests a possible resolution to the paradox described above. Section 6 
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studies other 2 x 2 games and applies the general results. An informal 
discussion on beliefs without experience is provided in Section 7. Finally 
the paper draws its conclusions in section 8. 
2 The General Environment 
Consider the following 2 x 2 game f : 
D 
player 1 C 
D f-----'-'--'----+--o:'--:c--1 
where E,e,{3 and a are all assumed to be positive.::! f is repeated infinitely 
between two players, player 1 and player 2. The action sets are Al = A2 = 
{C,D} with A = {C,D}2 ,a E A. Let 'Ui(t) : A -+ {c,t1,{3,a} be the period 
t payoff function for player i. By ft(A, u) we will mean the t-th repetition 
of f(A, u), t = 1,2, ..... Let Ht = At-I (the (t - I)-fold Cartesian product 
of A) be the set of all possible sequences of realized action pairs till the 
beginning of period t. Let ht E Ht and denote a(t) E A as the action 
pair realized at period t. \'Ve may also think of ht as a vector with (t - 1) 
components, each of which are elements of A. Furthermore, we may also 
think of each element a of A as a vector with two components. Interpreting 
histories and action profiles as vectors in appropriate spaces will be helpful 
in what follows. Typically, a repeated game strategy for player i at date t 
is a function if : Ht =t A. This implicitly assumes that players use entire 
histories in order to decide upon their current actions and therefore are able 
to use very long as well as possibly complicated histories as information 
sets. We would like to rule this out. So, suppose instead that players 
have cognitive bounds and therefore can only analyze histories of a certain 
cognitive complexity. For any 1 ::; Tb ::; Ta::; t, denote by ht (Tb, Ta) C ht a 
:1\'Vith 00 > Cl< > (3 > () > € > 0, r is the celebrated Prisoners' Dilemma. (The 
assumption that all entries in the payoff matrix are positive is discussed in subsection 
2.2). 
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segment of ht whose first period is Tb and last period is Ta. Let Ht(Tb,Ta) 
be the set of all possible segments of all possible elements of Ht. 
2.1 Cognitive Complexity 
Assume that players are unable to recognize patterns of histories.4 The 
cognitive complexity of a given history, or segment of history, is determined 
by its length and by its variability. The length of a history is straightforward 
to define, as it is simply the number of elements appearing in the history. 
Formally, length is an integer valued function f : Ht (Tb, Ta) -t Z+ defined 
as f(ht(Tb,Ta)) = Ta - Tb + 1. 
To obtain a formal definition of variability, we start defining, for a given 
segment of history ht(Tb,Ta) the finest partition P(ht(Tb,Ta)) as the parti-
tion putting in the same set identical elements. For example, if 
and if 
ht(Tb,Ta) 
P(ht(Tb,Ta)) 
ht(Tb,Ta) 
P(ht(Tb,Ta)) 
{ , " '} 1 a, a, a ,a, a ,a, a ,t len 
{{a,a,a,a}, {a',a'} , {a"}} 
{a,a,a,a,a,a}, then 
{ {a, a, a, a, a, a}} . 
The measure of variability we use is simply the cardinality of this finest parti-
tion minus 1. Formally, variability is an integer valued function v : Ht (Tb, Ta) 
-t Z+ defined as V(ht(Tb,Ta)) = iP(ht(Tb,Ta))i - 1. Thus, variability is 
directly related to the number of different elements appearing in a given 
history. From the above examples, 
v ( { a, a, a', a, a", a, a'} ) 2 and 
v({a,a,a,a,a,a}) o. 
·1 We agree that this is a relatively strong assumption and hope to relax it in future 
research. An interested reader may see Sonsino (1997) which studies a model of learning 
with the possibility of pattern recognition. 
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Given any history segment ht(Tb,Ta), we define the cognitive complexity 
(ccomp) of ht(Tb, Ta) as a function 
(1) 
with GO strictly increasing in C(ht(Tb, Ta)) and v(ht(Tb,Ta)). In this paper 
we adopt the following linear functional form for G(.) :3 
The cognitive complexity of a history segment simply equals the length of 
the segment plus its degree of heterogeneity. More generally our definition 
of cognitive complexity implies that cognitive complexity of an information 
set increases with the cardinality of the data set and the variation or hetero-
geneity of its composition. Note however that sequences of realized action 
profiles with very simple patterns (like Tit-for-Tat for example) may turn 
out to be significantly heterogenous. 
2.2 Behavior Rules for Players 
Players face cognitive bounds which equal a positive integer ( and is the 
same across players. They are assumed to look at the most recent history 
segments. For any repetition period t, let ilt C 17.1- be a segment of ht 
satisfying the following two conditions: 
(i) ccomp(ilt):::; (and (ii) ilt E argmax {ccomp(ht(Tb,t -1))}. (3) 
ht(Th,t-l) 
Thus, ilt is the most recent history segment with the highest cognitive com-
plexity that players can analyze at time t given their cognitive bound (. We 
assume that players always look at history segments ilt. To avoid abuse of 
notation, let E denote the relation 'is a component of the vector' and ~ the 
negation of E. Let IAil = N denote the number of actions available to player 
i = 1,2 (in the case of Prisoners' Dilemma, N = 2 for both players). For 
"Doing this does not affect the basic spirit of the results obtained. 
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any period t and for all k = 1,2, ... , N such that 3aEl1,t with a7Ea, define 
7r7(t)as 
(4) 
and for all k = 1,2, ... , N such that ~aEht with a7Ea, define 7r7(t) as 
N 
7r7(t) = L Wi (k, r) ui(a7, aj), i,j = 1,2. (5) 
r=l 
where Wi (k, r) 2: 0 is the belief probability held by player i regarding the 
N 
outcome (a7,aj) when she herself plays a7, with LWi (k,r) = 1 for all i. 
r=l 
Eq.(4) and Eq.(5) define what we will refer to as perceived payoff's of each 
action, In this paper we will work with the special case where Wi (k,r) = 
Wi (k, 1,1) for every r,1.1 E {I, 2, ... , N} . This is the case when players believe 
that all outcomes which are possible when they use strategies with no expe-
rience are equally likely. The results thus obtained with this simplification 
can in spirit be generalized, (j 
Eq, ( 4) says that if there is some element a in the history segment h t such 
that player i has taken action a7, then player i evaluates the perceived payoff 
of playing a7 in the subsequent period as the arithmetic mean of payoffs 
obtained in all cases in which he played a7 in ht. For example, consider r 
and let 
ht = {(C,D),(C,C),(C,C),(D,C),(D,D)}. 
Then, 7rf(t) = (2fJ+c:)/3, 7rf(t) = (ex+B)/2, 7rf(t) = (2fJ+c:)/3 and 
7r!l(t) = (ex + B) /2. On the other hand, if ht does not contain any action 
profile in which player i takes action a7, the perceived payoff of action a7 is 
[; An extensive discussion on this issue is provided in Section 7, 
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simply the arithmetic mean of all possible payoffs to player i. For example, 
let 
llt = {(C,C),(C,D),(C,C),(C,C),(C,D)}. 
Then, 7rf(t) = (a + B) /2. 
To distinguish our way of computing perceived payoffs from that in the 
existing literature on quantal response learning, let t = 5, ( = 2 and consider 
the history 
ht = {(C, C), (D, D), (C, D), (D, C)} . 
From Eq.(3), 11t = {(D, C)} . Then, in our formulation, 
7rf(t) = (f3 + E)/2, 7rf(t) = a, 7rf(t) = E, and 7r?(t) = (0: + B)/2 
while in the standard formulation, 
7rf(t) = (f3+E)/2,7rf(t) = (B+a)/2,7rf(t) = (f3 + c:)/2 and 7r?(t) = (B+a)/2. 
Notice that vvith cognitive bounds, player 2 thinks that C is a relatively 
unfruitful action. This is because he forgets (or, in a time-constrained ex-
perimental setup, does not have enough time to realize) that C had actually 
yielded a high payoff equal to f3 when his opponent also played C. This is 
not the case with unbounded cognition as then players will be able to keep 
account of all past experiences. 
After computing 7rf(t) for every k, players assign probabilities with which 
each action is chosen for play in period t. Let cTf(t) be the choice probability 
assigned by player i to action af at period t. Using the Logit framework/ 
(6) 
'This is in fact a "Luce" model of choice (see Luce (1959)). 
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with ,\ E [0,00] being a parameter measuring the degree of rationality of 
the players. By the use of the term 'rationality' we mean closeness of a 
players choice probabilities to those of the myopic best response choices. 
The functional form of a1(t) as in Eq.(6) is also used in Chen, Thisse and 
Friedman (1997). This formulation is invariant to linear transformations 
of the perceived payoffs. However it is undefined if for a history segment, 
the sum of payoff experiences is zero for at least one player. To avoid this 
problem, we assume that the payoff matrix of r has only positive entries. 
An alternative formulation, adopted by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), is 
(7) 
This formulation has the advantage of taking care of negative payoffs but is 
not invariant to linear transformations. In appendix A.3, we show that our 
results hold with this alternative formulation as well. 
Notice that ht is the memory of the players and £ (il,t) is a stochastic pro-
cess determined by the evolution of play. In the next section, we will study 
the nature of this stochastic process. As far as the rationality parameter is 
concerned, it is straightforward to see that if,\ = 0, players always play each 
action with probability equal to 11N. However, as ,\ increases, actions with 
better past experiences receive higher choice probabilities (,\ = 00 coincid-
ing \vith myopic expected payoff maximization). From a statistical point of 
view, players may be thought of as committing errors in deciding upon the 
choice probabilities. Then,'\ varies inversely with these errors. tl With,\ = 0, 
there is a unique equilibrium at the centroid of the (N2 - 1)- dimensional 
simplex of probability measures over action profiles for any value of (. On 
"IVlention must also be made of the fact that players always have the option of using 
some belief updating mechanism (like the moving averages technique) which may only 
require them to keep track of few basic statistics. In such settings, the model studied in 
this paper can be approximated to cases where players make errors in such updating with 
such errors decreasing in ( and >.. 
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the other extreme, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) show that with ( = 00, 
as A -t 00, every Logit equilibrium approaches the Nash equilibrium of the 
static game. The above kind of probability choice function is commonly 
known as logistic quantal response function (LQRF) as in McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1995). The learning process with which we deal here is therefore a 
variant of the logistic quantal response learning (LQ RL) of Mookherjee and 
Sopher (1997) in the sense that information sets are not any more the entire 
history that players confront; rather they are only segments of these histo-
ries up to what cognitive bounds enable players to look at. We therefore call 
our learning process bounded logistic quantal response learning (B LQ RL ). 
Note that in our model, players have two bounds. The first one is a bound 
on their cognitive capability by which they are unable to analyze history 
segments of complexity higher than this bound. The second one is a bound 
on their rationality in computing choice probabilities while looking at these 
history segments. Two players may have enough cognitive capacity to ana-
lyze long history segments but one who is endowed with Cl higher value of A 
will play more frequently those actions which yielded higher payoff's in the 
past. 
3 Analysis of memory and stochastic information 
sets 
In this section we show that the stochastic process generated by the behavior 
rules of players in rOO(A, u) can be represented by a Markov Chain for an 
appropriate state space defined below when the cognitive bound faced by 
players is finite. 
vVe begin with the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 1 For any repetition period t, for any ht E Ht, and for any ( < 00, 
( - 1 ~ ccon1p(ht) ~ (. 
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Proof. The right hand inequality is straightforward. Suppose the left 
hand inequality is violated and that (without loss of generality) ccomp(h,t) = 
( - 2. Increase £(h/) to £(f1,t) + 1 by including the last element of ht that did 
not enter fit. Call this extension fit!. Then, v(f1,tt) either equals v(f1,t) or is 
equal to v(h.t} + 1. It suffices to consider the case v(t;,tI) = v(h,t) + 1. Then, 
and therefore 
a contradiction. _ 
Although players can analyze histories with cognitive complexity equal 
to (, the evolution of play may be such that players are not able to use 
their full cognitive capacity at each repetition period because there may 
exist moments of play when, if they try to look at one more element of the 
history they confront, they get confused (or they run out of time in time-
constrained experiments). In other words, there may be periods where there 
is no immediate history segment that matches exactly their cognitive bound 
and therefore players have no other choice but to analyze that segment which 
has the highest cognitive complexity given their cognitive bound. However, 
the above lemma also shows that there will never come a period where they 
will under utilize their capacity beyond one unit of their cognition. 
Define the set H(x) := { hE :9: Ht I £(h) + v(h) = x} and consider the 
set B(():= U H(x). Given Lemma(l), B(() is the set of all possible 
(-l:Sx:S( 
sequences of elements of A with cognitive complexities between ( - 1 and ( 
and therefore can be thought of as the set of all possible fit for all periods 
t. In other words, at any period the information set used by players must 
belong to B((). 
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As A is finite and ( < 00, B(() is a finite set (since £(h) :s: (V11 E B(()) 
and we call B(() the state space. We now proceed to define a Markov Chain 
on B((). 
Definition 2 Given any 11 E B((), h' E B(() is an immediate successor of 
h, denoted by (1)(11' I 11), iff (i) the £(h')-th component of j;,' is a new far 
7·ight addition to 11 and (ii) for each integer 0 :s: n :s: £(11) - 1, the n-th last 
component of h is the (n + l)-th last component of h'. 
Not all pairs of elements of B(() can be immediate successors of each 
other. Given any history segment h, a new realized action profile arrives 
in the subsequent period which necessarily becomes the last element of the 
immediate next history segment players utilize. However, since this may 
actually alter the variability of realized history, in order to satisfy the cogni-
tiye bound, some initial elements of the previous history segment may need 
to be deleted in the construction of its immediate successor. For example 
consider r and let ( = 2. Then, 
B(() = { {(C,C)},{(D,D)},{(C,D)},{(D,C)},{(C,C),(C,C)}, } 
{(D, D), (D, D)}, {(C, D), (C, D)}, {(D, C), (D, C)} . 
Notice that with ( = 2 and given Lemma 1, vectors consisting of two com-
ponents can be present only if they are identical. Let h = {(D,D),(D,D)} 
and let the current action profile be (C, C). Then the immediate successor of 
his (C,C). In fact, history segments {(D,D),(D,D)},{(C,C)},{(C,D)} 
and {(D, C)} are the only possible immediate successors of h. 
Let 11 be the current state of the Markov Chain. In our model, knowl-
edge of 11 is all that is needed to determine the probability of the next 
period history segment. We therefore drop the use of time as a subscript 
for the period history segments. The process moves from this current state 
to an immediate successor state h' according to the following transition 
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rule. Denote by Pr(a(t) E A I h) as the conditional probability of real-
izing action profile a = (aI, a2) at period t given information set h. We 
know that Pr(a(t) E A I h) = a~1(t).a~2(t), where a~i(t) is given by Eq.(6). 
Pr (a E A I h) then induces a probability distribution for h' given the com-
plexity bound of the players. We denote this induced probability distribution 
by f ~1)(11' I h) and call it the transitional probability distribution (the use 
of). as a subscript for f is to highlight the dependence of f on ).). Thus the 
Markov chain is denoted by M == (B((),fl1)(h' I h)) ((B((),h) in short). 
Denote by B(()j~)(11) the support of fi1)(h' I 11). 
Lemma 3 If h' E B(()j~) (l1),then £(h') :::; £(h) + 1. 
Proof. To see this observe that if £(h') > £(h)+I, implying, without loss 
of generality, that £(11') = £(h) + 2, it must be that the first component (call 
it a*) of 11' is the last component in h E Ht, for some t ::::: [~] after which h 
is truncated to form 11. Since a*~h, it must be that for the extended vector 
(a* ,11), ccomp(a*, h) > (. But by construction, (a* ,11) c h' if£(h') = £(h) +2 
implying that ccomp( h') > ccomp( a*, h) and thus 11' tf. B( () and therefore 
cannot belong to a subset of it .• 
Between two consecutive periods, players cannot gain more than one 
unit length of memory. However, they may lose their current memory by 
more than one period if realization of play increases the heterogeneity of 
the current path of play significantly. As examples, let ( = 4 and consider 
the evolution of play given by the following end tail of a period t history 
ht = { ....... ,a',a,a,a}. Then, ht = {a, a, a}. Suppose now that at period 
t, the realized action profile is a. Then, 11t+1 = {a, a, a, a} and therefore 
£(11t+1) = 4 > £(ht) = 3. Now consider the end tail ht = { ....... a", a', a, ,a'} . 
Here, ht = {a', a, a'}. Suppose now that at period t, the realized action 
profile is a". In that case, ht+1 = {a',a"} and therefore £(ht+l) = 2 < 
£(11t) = 3. 
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In general, let (n) (h' I h) denote the relation that [1' is an n-period 
ahead successor of [1 and consider the set B(()j:) ([1). Before ending this 
section, we prove the following three lemmas on reducibility and periodicity 
of 1..1 == (B((), h). 
Lemma 4 If ( < 00, then Vh, h' E B((), 3n(h, h') < 00 such that h' E 
B(()f(~(hN))(hA), ".e., t t· h bl f t t· fi . A very s a e zs reac a e ram any s a e m some mte 
time. 
Proof. 
Since A is a finite set, ( < 00, and Va E A, vh E B(() we have Pr (a E 
A I h,) > 0, we can begin to construct any [1' by adding from the right the 
first element of h' to [L, then adding to the far right the second element of 
h' to the previous extension of h, ..... , then adding to the far right the last 
element of h' to the previous extension of [1. This only needs finitely many 
such addition steps for any h,i1' E B(() .• 
To move to the next lemma, we require the notion of periodicity of 
NIarkov chains. Given the Ivlarkov chain M == (B((), h), the state ,; has 
period cl if 
where GC D stands for greatest common divisor. If cl = 1, 1..1 == (B( (), f>.) 
is called aperiodic. 
Lemma 5 (i)If ( = 1, then M = (B((), h) is aperiodic. 
(ii) If ( 2:: 2, M = (B((), h) has period greater than one. 
Proof. (i) When ( = 1, h is a singleton set, implying that B(l) = A. 
Since Pr(a' I a) > 0 Va, a' E A, the result follows. 
(ii) Take any ( 2:: 2 and any h E B((). The set B(()j~)([1) is such that 
V[1' E B(()j~) (h), 3m(h')with m(h')-th last element of [1 being the first ele-
ment of h', m( h') + 1-th last element of h being the second element of [1', .... , 
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last element of h being the second last element of h', and the last element 
of h' being a new far right addition to h. Now, h' = 11, only if h is a finite 
constant sequence of elements of A. Since such sequences form only a proper 
subset of 8( (), M == (8( (), f>..) loses aperiodicity . 
• 
Since M == (8( (), f>..) is irreducible by lemma 3, any two states hand 
11' will have the same period and therefore we can define the period of the 
Markov Chain itself. For example, with ( = 2, 11, can be either {a, a} or 
{ a'} . If h = {a, a} and 11,' = {a} , ill) (11,' / 11,) = 0 since realization of action 
profile a given a history segment {a, a} implies that h' = {a, a} . 
4 Convergence Results 
Having established the above properties of the Markov chain M == (8((), f>..) , 
in this section we prove two convergence results, one when ( = 1, the case 
when the Markov chain is aperiodic, and the other when ( 2: 2, and the 
Markov chain loses aperiodicity. These results will help us characterize long 
run outcomes of roo. As the result for ( = 1 will turn out to be the funda-
mental one, we will state and provide a self contained proof of it by closely 
following Theorem 8.9 in Billingsley (1986). We will then see that our result 
with ( 2: 2 is a direct consequence of the result with ( = 1 once we further 
show that our general :Markov chain satisfies an additional requirement of 
primitivity. We will deal with these issues separately in the following two 
subsections. 
4.1 (= 1 
In the following theorem we prove that if ( = 1, there is a long run stationary 
probability distribution for the evolution of the states of M. Let /8( () / 
denote the cardinality of 8((). Note that 8(1) = A. Define 
'Y = min /l)(h' / h). A •• A 
h,h'EB(l) 
(8) 
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T A is the minimum probability, over all possible pairs of history segments, 
of moving from a given current state to its immediate successor state. It 
therefore gives a lower bound to the probability of evolution of the path of 
play in the sense that given a realized path of play up to time t, TA is the 
lowest probability with which the most unlikely future path of play begins 
t.o evolve. 
Theorem 6 If ( = 1,1\11 = (B(l),1>.) has a stationary distribution f~(·) 
such that Vh, h/ E B(l), 
Ifin)(h, I il') - f~(h')1 ::; (1- IAIB(l)l)n 
with (1 -{AIB(OI) E [0,1). 
Proof. 
Let m(n)(il) = n~infin)(h I il,') , and M(n)(h) = n1,.axfin)(h I il/). It fol-
w w 
lows that m(n+1)(il) = n~inLfi1)(h" I iL').ft)(h I h") 2: n~inLf2)(h" I 
hi It" hi It" 
ill)m(n)(h) = m(n)(h) and M(n+1)(il) = m~axLf2)(il" I il').fin)(h I h") 
hi ;'/1 
::; maxit' L fi1) (il" I il') .!lI(n) (il) = M(n) (il). Since men) (i1) ::; M(n) (h,) 
it" 
viz E B(l), we have 
From the aperiodicity of M = (B(l), 1>.) , we know that fi1) (i1 i1') > 
OVi1,h' E B(l) so that 0 < TA ::; IB(l)l. Fix any two states h,* and i1**. 
For any arbitrary function gofi1) let L>g(2)(h)) be the summation over 
iz E B(l) such that fi1\il, I h*) 2: fi1)(fc I h**) and L<gUi1\iz)) be the 
summation over i1 E B(l) such that fi1) (h I i1*) < fi1) (i1 I i1**). Then, 
L2 [fi1) (h I h*) - fll) (11 I 11**)] 
+ L< [fi1\h I i1*) - fi1\i1 I 11**)] = 0 (10) 
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Since 
we get 
2::2 [fi1\h 1 h*) - fi1)(h 1 h**)] = 1 - 2::< fi1)(h 1 h*) 
- 2::2 fi1)(h h**) 
< 1-I'AIB(1)1. (11) 
From Eq.(10) and Eq.(ll), we have 
fin+1) (i1' i1*) - fin+1)(h' 1 h**) 
= ~ (12) (i1 1 h*) - fi1) (h 1 h**)) fin) (i1' 1 i1) 
h 
< 2::2 (1i1)(h 1 h*) - fi1)(h 1 h**)) M(n) (h') 
+ 2::< (f2)(h 1 i1*) - fi1)(i11 h**)) m(n)(h/) 
= 2::2 (fi1)(i1 1 h*) - fi1)(i11 h**)) (M(n) (i1') - m(n) (i1')) 
< (1 - I'A 18(1)1) (M(n)(h') - m(n) (h') ) . 
Since i1* and i1** are arbitrary, we can write 
implying that 
(12) 
From Eq.(9) and Eq.(12), we know that M(n) (i1) and rn(n) (i1) have a common 
limit. Call this limit f~(i1). From Eq.(12), we get 
(13) 
Since 0 < )'A ::; IB«() I ' 1 -)A 18(1)1 E [0,1) . Therefore, 
lim (1 - I'>.18(1)lt = 0 implying that fin\h 1 h') -+ f~(i1) as n -+ 00. 
11.--+00 
• 
We are now in a position to deal with the case ( 2: 2. 
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4.2 (2: 2 
Since M == (B( (), f>.) is irreducible for all values of (, it is a standard 
result that there exist asymptotic stationary average probabilities of being 
in any state and these probabilities are independent of initial conditions. 
However, existence of a stationary distribution is not guaranteed and we 
will in fact show such existence. An interesting property of the Markov 
Chain, proved in Proposition 7 of this section, is that for each value of 
( there exists a positive integer n( () such that f~(() (h 1 hi) > 0 for all 
iL, hi E B( (). This makes the stochastic matrix primitive (a nonnegative 
matrix A is primitive if there exists some finite k > 0 such that A k > > 
0) and enables us to convert the Markov Chain Ai == (B((), f>.) into its 
n(()- step Markov Chain Ain(O == (B((), h..,n(O) such that a unit transition 
period of .Mn(() == (B((), f>.,n(()) is equivalent to n(() transition periods of 
Ai == (B((), f>.). Since Ain(() == (B((), f>.,n(O) is then not only irreducible 
but also aperiodic, ,ve obtain results on stationary distributions of states of 
1I171(() == (B((), h"n(()). This subsection will deal with these issues. 
Proposition 7 Let M == (B((), f>.) be the Markov Chain as described in 
section 3. Define an integer function n: Z+ \ {I} ----t Z+,T/,: (f-+ n(() such 
that 
n(() = argmin {m E Z+ 1 f;::(i7.1 i/,/) > O,ViL,f/ E B(()}. 
Tn 
Then, (i) n(() exists and (ii) n(() = (. 
Proof. 
(i) Denote by F(() = [f>.(h 1 i-L')] _ _ the stochastic matrix of the 
h,h'EB(O 
l\1arkov chain M == (B( (), f>.) and Fm its m- th power. We need to show the 
existence ofn(() E Z+ such that pn((»> 0, i.e., f~(()(i11 i7/) > O,Vh,i1' E 
B((). 
T 
Let (Pi)r=l be the set of eigenvalues of P(() and Jet C(p) = IT (p -
i=l 
Pi) be its characteristic function which can be rewritten as C(p) = pT + 
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r-l 
pi L aipi-(r-l) with ai -# 0 Vi = 1,2, ... , r. Define 
i=l 
b = # {Pi I v(F(()) = IPil , v(F(()) = mfx {pJ } . 
Thus v(F(()) is the spectrum of F((). Since F(() is such that V(, trace(F(()) > 
0, by lemma 4.10 in Graham (1987), b = 1. Since b = 1 is the definition for 
F( () to be primitive!!, our result follows. 
(ii) Part (i) establishes that for any value of (, there exists an integer n(() 
such that J~«()(h I h') > O,Vh,h' E B((). Let (E Z+ \ {I} and choose two 
constant (-length sequences (a,a, .... ,a) and (a',a', .... ,a') with a,a' E A, 
a -# a'. Since ccomp of these sequences equal (, they are elements of B((). 
Without loss of generality, let h = (a, a, .... , a) and h' = (a', a', .... , a') . It is 
straightforward to see that 
arg,;;lin {m E Z+ I Jr(l" I h') > O} = (. 
Now choose any other pair of states h * , h ** E B (() such that 
m* = arg~in {m E Z+ I Jr(I,,* I h**) > O} > (. 
Since Pr(a I I,,) > 0 Va E A,VI" E B((), and Vm < m* we have J';'(ll* I h**) = 
0, it must be that f!(ll*) = m* > ( implying that Il* rf:- B((). Therefore, 
n(() = ( .• 
We will now deal with lvI( == (B((), h,() which is irreducible and aperi-
odic and prove the following theorem. Let 
"f>. ( = __ min J>.,dh I h'). 
, h,h'EB«() 
(14) 
Theorem 8 V( 2: 2, M( == (B( (), h,d has a stationary distribution g~ (-) 
such that VI", h' E B( (), 
Iftj(h I h') - g~(h)1 ~ (1 - "f>.,( IB(()lt 
!JIf b = 1, Ak »0 for some finite k > O. (See Graham (1987). 
21 
Proof. Given Proposition 7, this is a direct application of Theorem 6 .• 
Notice that g~ (i,) is the stationary distribution of the (- step Markov 
chain !vj(() == (8( (), f>..,d . Since our main concern is with the long run dis-
tribution of the Markov chain NI == (8((),f>..) , we need to interpret g~(il,) in 
terms of NI == (8( (), f>..) . In this sense, gHi,) is the long run probability with 
which h occurs in every (- th period. Therefore the long run probability 
distribution of NI == (8((), f>..) is such that f;(h) will be around g~(h) and 
at every (- th period will exactly equal g~ (h). As far as our interests go, we 
can keep this informal interpretation in mind and proceed to characterize 
long run outcomes of r oo . 
5 Long Run Outcomes in Prisoners' Dilemma 
We are now in a position to characterize convergence of play in infinitely 
repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. In the previous sections we abstracted from 
action profiles and dealt with the evolution of history segments. These his-
tory segments in turn are the information sets of the learning mechanism 
used in deciding upon the choice probabilities. Since choice of actions in 
turn determines the actual path of play and therefore the sequence of fu-
ture history segments used as information sets, convergence in probability 
of information sets should also imply convergence of the choice probabilities. 
The case ( = 1 is rather simple as history segments are then singleton sets 
of realized actions and convergence of history segments immediately implies 
convergence of actions. However, when ( 2: 2, history segments may consist 
of more than one realized action pair and therefore we need to study conver-
gence of actual play more carefully. As before, we will study these two cases 
separately. The following proposition shows that with ( = 1, highly rational 
probability choices converge to the stationary N ash equilibrium if defecting 
is highly rewarding but otherwise converge to the cooperative outcome. 
Proposition 9 Let ( = 1. 
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(i) If 0: + e < 2(3 and (3 + c > 2e, lim f; (C, C) = 1. 
),--+00 
(ii) If 0: + e > 2(3 and (3 + c < 2e, lim f;(D, D) = 1. 
),--+00 
Proof. Consider the stochastic matrix F),(( = 1) == [f>-(h I h')]~ ~ 
h,h'EB(l) 
of the Markov chain M == (8(1), f>-) . Since f; = (f;(h))~ is the sta-
hEB(!) 
tionary probability distribution, we have 
V).. E [0,00] . (15) 
(i) If 0: + e < 2(3 and (3 + c > 2e, and states are arranged in the order 
(C, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D), 
lim FA (( ~ 1) ~ ( ~ 0 0 n 0 0 (16) ),--+00 0 0 0 1 1 
From Eq.(15) and Eq.(16), we have 
lim f>'(C,C) + lim f>'(D,D) = lim f>' (C, C) and 
). --+ 00 >. --+ 00 ),--+00 
lim f;(C, D) + lim f;(D, C) = lim f;(D, D). 
>.--+00 ),->00 ).->00 
Since 0 :::; f; (h) :::; 1 V)" E [0,00] , Vh E 8(1), it follows that 
lim f;(C, C) = 1 and lim f;(h) = 0 Vh E 8(1), h =I- (C, C). 
>.->00 ).->00 
(ii) If 0: + e > 2(3 and (3 + c < 2e and the order of the states are preserved 
as in part (i), 
lim F>.(( = 1) = ( o~ 
),--+00 
1 
From Eq.(15) and Eq.(17), we have 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
1 1 
(17) 
lim f>'(C, C) = lim f;(C, D) = lim f>'(D, C) = 0, lim f;(D, D) = 1. 
~oo ~oo ~oo ~oo 
23 
• 
Proposition 9 says that in Prisoners' Dilemmas with A ---* 00, if the 
average cooperative payoff is less than the defective payoff and the average 
defective payoff is higher than the cooperative payoff, sufficiently rational 
players individually converge to the Nash equilibrium and play D most of 
the time in the long run. On the other hand, if the average defecting payoff 
is less than the cooperative payoff and the average cooperative payoff is 
greater than the defective payoff, we expect rational play to converge to 
cooperation. The intuition here is that with one period memory (and we 
will see that this intuition holds for any finite cognitive bound), whenever 
play moves away from at least one player defecting, players perceive that a 
payoff from a deviation to action D is only the average of the two possible 
payoff realizations from such a deviation. On the other hand, with infinite 
memory, players always remember some past experience with action D that 
produced a higher payoff and therefore as A ---* 00, they eventually deviate. 
The proposition shows that we can define two classes of Prisoners' Dilem-
mas, one where defecting is relatively more rewarding and we converge to 
the N ash equilibrium, and the other where cooperating is relatively more re-
warding and we converge to the Pareto dominant outcome. There are other 
classes of Prisoners' Dilemmas which do not fall in either of the two classes 
mentioned above. However, Theorem 6 tells us that nevertheless, players 
will converge to some stationary probability distribution in any finite game. 
Proposition 10 Let 00 > ( 2: 2. 
(i) If a + B < 2{3 and {3 + c > 2B, 
1· *({(C C) (- time., (C C)}) - 1 1nl g). " .............. ,' . 
).--->00 
(ii) If a + B > 2{3 and {3 + c < 2B, 
1· *({(D D) (- ti'lll(,,' (D D)}) - 1 1nl g). " .............. ,' . 
).--->00 
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Proof. The strategy of the proof is as follows. We show that the system 
lim Figt = gt satisfies what is claimed in part (i) and part (ii) of the above 
),-+00 
statement. In order to do this, we first compute Fi and show that lim Fi 
),-+00 
satisfies conditions under which our results are outcomes of unique solutions 
to the system lim Figt = gt. The proof involves a number of steps, each 
),-+00 
considering subsets of the state space of history segments that partition the 
set 8((). For a given (2: 2, denote by Le(a,a', ..... ,a' .. · .. ') c Ht(Tb,Ta) the 
collection of history segments with cognitive complexity between ( and ( - 1 
and consisting all elements a, a', ..... , a'····.! at least once and no other element. 
(i) STEP l. Consider Ld(G,D), (D,G), (D,D)} C Ht(Tb, Ta). By the 
definition of the Prisoners' Dilemma, Vi = 1,2, we have 
{
CAt } lim (Ji (t) I h E Ld(G, D), (D, G), (D, D)} = O. 
),-+00 
STEP 2. ConsiderLd(G,D),(D,D)}andLd(D,G),(D,D)} C Ht(Tb,Ta). 
Given the definition of the Prisoners' Dilemma, 
lim {(JP(t) I ht E Le {(G,D), (D,D)}} 
),-->00 
lim {(JP(t) I ht E Ld(D,G),(D,D)}} l. 
),-+00 
STEP 3. Consider Ld(G, D), (G, G)} c Ht(Tb, Ta) and Ld(D, G), (G, G)} C 
Ht(Tb,Ta). Vht E Ld(G,D), (G,G)}, (Jf(t) -+ 0 as A -+ 00 (as Cl: > (3) and 
(JP(t) -+ 1 as A -+ 00 if fLt is such that (G, D) occurs sufficiently many times 
while (JP (t) -+ 0 as A -+ 00 if ht is such that (G, G) occurs sufficiently many 
times. Thus, Vht E Ld(G,D),(G,G)}, 
A tI At lim h,e( h I h ) = 1. 
),-+00 
hYELd(C,D),(D,D)} 
Take any htl E Ld(G,D),(D,D)}. Then, by STEP 2, Vi = 1,2, (Jf(t) -+ 
1 as A -+ 00. The argument is symmetric Vht E Le { (D, G), (C, cn . 
STEP 4. Let Ld(D,D),(G,G)} C Ht(Tb,Ta) be collection of history 
segments containing both (G, G) and (D, D). Ld(D, D), (G, C)} c 8(() if 
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( 2: 3. Since f3 > e, either 
1· f ((C C) (-tillles (C C) 1nl '\,( , , ............ , , 
,\ ..... 00 
1· f ((C C) (-I)-tillles (C C) Im '\,( , ,............, , 
,\ ..... 00 
ht E Ld(D,D), (C,C)}) = 1 or 
ht E L( {(D, D), (C, C)}) = 1. 
STEP 5. Let L( {(C, D), (D, C)} C Ht(Tb, Ta) be collection of history 
segments containing both (C,D) and (D,C). L( {(C,D), (D,C)} c B(() if 
( 2: 3. By the definition of the Prisoners' Dilemma, 
1im {ap(t) I j"t E Ld(C, D), (D,C)}} = 1. 
,\ ..... 00 
STEP 6. Let L«(a) c Ht(Tb,Ta) be collections of constant history seg-
ments, a E A. If a = (C, C) and (a + e) /2 < f3 
If a = (D, D), and (f3 + E)/2 > e, 
lim h,((( C, C), .. ~.-: .. t~i:~l.':~.,( C, C) I fit E L( {(D, D)}) = 1. 
.>- ..... 00 
If a = (C, D) or (D, C), 
1· f ((D D) (- tilll"S (D D) Im .>-, , , ...•.. .' .•.. : .•• , , 
...\----+00 ,. 
l~t E Ld(C, D)}) = 
1· f ((D D) (- lilllPS (D D) 1nl '\,( , , ...... .' .... : ... , , 
,\ ..... 00 
j"t E L( {(D,C)}) = 1. 
(CC) STEP 7. Define L(' {a,a', ..... ,a'··'} c Ht(Tb,Ta) such that ::la' = 
A (C C) A (C, C) and ::la" f. (C, C). For any ht E L,' {a, a', ..... , a''''''} , ht cannot be 
rcpeated. To see this observe that given any j"t = {01, ..... , an} , for some 
n, if ak = (C,C), k :S n, and if::lj 2: 1 such that a(t + j) = (C,C), then 
Vm 2: 1, a(t+j +m) = (C,C) if (f3+E) > 2e and (a+e) < 2f3. Thus 
starting from any ,"t E L~C,C) {a,a', ..... , a''''''} ,we end up in anyone of the 
above cases. 
Now consider the stochastic matrix Fi = [h ((fi I '"')] _ _ of the 
, h,h'EB(() 
(-step Markov chain M( == (B( (), he). Since g~ = [g~ (h)] _ is the 
, hEB(() 
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stationary distribution V)" E [0,1] ,V2 :s; ( < 00, 
F ( * * ),.g),. = g),.. (18) 
Given STEP 1 through STEP 7 above, consider the permutation of Fi such 
that the states are ordered as 
{ (C C) (- t.imes (C C)} , , .............. ,' , 
{ (C, C), ~~.~~!.-:-.:!~~l.(:~( C, C) } , 
{ (D D) (- t.imes (D D)} , , .............. ,' , 
{(D, D), ~~.-:-.~!:-: .. t..i~~l.(:~(D, D) } , 
Then, as ).. -+ 00, Fi satisfies the following conditions: 
hi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4) = 1, 
(ii) )im J>.,dfLl 
A-+OO 
hi, i = 5, .... , IB(OI) = 0, and 
5, .... , IB(()II hj,j = 1,2, .... , IB(()I) = 0. 
Furthermore, since J>.,((fL I hi) E [0,1] vfL, hi E B(() and I: J>.,((h I hi) = 
hEB() 
IVh,1 E B(() and V)" E [0,00) ,it is easy to see that the unique solution to the 
system as ).. -+ 00 is 
1· *({(C C) (- t.illWS (C C)}) - 1 1nl g),. " ............ ,' . 
),.-+00 
(ii) Following the proof in part (i) it can be shown that for the permu-
tation of Fi such that the states are arranged in the following order, 
{ (D D) (- times (D D)} , , .............. ,' , 
{(D, D), ~~.-:-.~)::-.. t..i~~l.':~(D, D) } , 
{(C C) (- tinws (C C)} , , .............. ,' , 
{(C, C), ~~.-:-.~)::-.:,.i~~l.(:~(C, C)} , 
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if 0: + 8 > 2(3 and (3 + E < 28, as A --+ 00, Fi satisfies 
hi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4) = 1, 
hi,'i = 5, .... ,IB(()1 = 0, and 
(iii) lim fA,c(hi,i 
A->OO 
5, .... ,18(()11 hj,j = 1,2, .· .. ,18(()I) = 0 
and thus the result follows . 
• 
The above proposition shows that if 0:+8 < 2(3, i3+E > 28 and ( < 00, the 
Markov chain Aj( has stationary distribution g~ such that the probability of 
realizing the history segment { (C, C), . ~.-: .. t.i:~l.(:~, ( C, C) } tends to 1 as A --+ 00. 
Does this necessarily guarantee that for the Markov chain !vI == (8 (() , fA) , 
tl 1· t t {(C C) (- tilll('S (C C)} 1 t . d' ,le lIS ory segnlen " ...... ; ... ;'." a so occurs a every peno In 
the long run with probability one? The following Corollary deals with this. 
Corollary 11 Let!lI and Jvj( be as defined above 'With long run stationary 
distribu,tions f~ and g~ respectively. Consider any constant history segment 
{(a) ,~-:-:.~~~I!~:" (a)} of length ( 'With a E {C, D}2 such that 
1· *({() (- tilll,(:,' ( )}) - 1 1111 9 A a, .; .......... , a . 
A->CXJ 
Then, 
1· f*({() (- hmI'S ( )}) - 1 IlTI A a, ............ , a . 
A->OO 
Proof. Consider any (- length period starting at t - ( and ending at 
t - 1 for some t sufficiently large. Let 7r be the probability that a( T) = 
() "IT E {t - (, .... , t - I} and 7rT be the probability that a( T) = a 'iT E 
{t-(, .... ,T},T::; t -1 for some a E {C,D}2. It follows that 7rT 2:: 7r 
'iT E {t - (, ..... , t - I} . Since 
{}~~g~ ( { (a), .~.-: .. t.i:~l.(:~,(a) }) = 1 } =? 7r = 1 as t --+ 00, 
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we have 
1fT~lVTE{t-(, ..... ,t-l} ast-+oo. 
Since by definition, 1fT ::; 1, we get 
1fT = 1 'liT E {t - (, ..... , t - I} as t -+ 00 
which implies 
1· f*({() (- t.illWH ( )}) - 1 In1 A a, ............ , a . 
A-->OO 
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The conditions Cl: + () < 2(3 and (3 + c > 2() guarantee that in the long 
run (C, C) is played with probability one while Cl: + () > 2(3 and (3 + c < 2() 
guarantee that (D, D) is played with probability one. 
6 Application to other 2 x 2 Games with (= 1 
In this section we apply our general results to a large class of 2 x 2 games 
which include Pure Coordination, Common Interest and the game of Chicken, 
under the restriction that the length of the memory cannot exceed unity. We 
then argue why the results in this section hold in principle even when the 
complexity of the history segments used exceed one. 
6.1 Pure Coordination 
Consider r with (3 > e > c, Cl: > 0 with c and Cl: close to zero and Cl: < (3. Then 
r is a game of Pure Coordination with two pure strategy Nash equilibria 
(C, C) and (D, D) with (C, C) Pareto dominating all other outcomes. 
Proposition 12 Let ( = 1 and r be a game of Pure Coordination. For 
c and Cl: sufficiently small, if 2() < (3 + c, (C, C) is the unique long run 
equilibrium for>.. -+ 00. 
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Proof. Following the procedure described in the proof of Proposition 9, 
if the states are arranged in the order (C,C),(D,D),(C,D),(D,C), and if 
2e < {3, we have 
( 
1 1 0 0) 
. 000 0 }!.:!F.\(( = 1) = 0 0 0 1 
o 0 1 0 
and therefore the unique solution to the system FA (( 
desired when A -+ 00 . 
• 
l)f~ f~ IS as 
Our model therefore predicts that players will eventually converge with 
probability one to the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium in a game of Pure 
Coordination if they have a unit cognitive bound and the Pareto dominant 
Nash equilibrium is sufficiently payoff rewarding. 
6.2 Common Interest 
Consider r with {3 > 0: > e > c > 0 with c close to zero. Then r is a game of 
Common Interest 'with two pure strategy Nash equilibria (C,C) and (D,D) 
with (C, C) Pareto dominating all other outcomes. 
Proposition 13 Let ( = 1 and let r be a game of Common InteTest. FaT 
c sufficiently small, 'if et > (f3t") > e, (C, C) is the unique long '/"Un equi-
libTiwrl when A -+ 00. 
Proof. If the states are arranged in the order (C, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D), 
and if 0: > (f3t") > e, we have 
lim F)..(( = 1) = 
)..->00 ( 0~1 ~~ ~~ 0001 ) 
and therefore the unique solution to the system FA (( 
desired when A -+ 00 .• 
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l)f~ f~ is as 
Our model therefore predicts that players will eventually converge with 
probability one to the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium in a game of Com-
mon Interest if they face unit cognitive bounds and Cl: > (,6~€) > e. The 
intuition behind this result is that with (,6~€) > e, payoff experience of e 
makes both players play C with very high probability and eventually both 
players start playing C. By the definition of a Common Interest game, once 
we observe play of (C, C), players keep playing C with high probabilities 
which converge to one as their rationality parameter approaches infinity. 
Moreover, if they ever observe play of (D, C) or (C, D), if Cl: > (,6~€) , the 
probability of both players playing D is very high. This further implies that 
with a very high probability (which tends to one as rationality is increased 
unboundedly) we observe play of (D, D) and then play converges to (C, C). 
If on the other hand Cl: < (~) , one may show that there exists a long run 
equilibrium where players alternatively mis-coordinate. 
6.3 Chicken and the Fairness Equilibrium 
Consider r with E > e > a > {3 > 0 . Then r is a game of Chicken with two 
pure strategy Nash equilibria (C,D) and (D,C). Following Rabin (1993) 
and Camerer (1997), suppose player 1 has a positive 'sympathy' coefficient 
when player 2 'kindly helps' player 1 and conversely a negative 'sympathy' 
coefficient when player 2 behaves 'meanly' by choosing an action that hurts 
player 1. Rabin assumes that such feelings add to the utility from money 
payoffs, but become relatively less important as money payoffs rise. These 
assumptions and a few others (see Rabin) lead to the concept of a fairness 
equilibrium. First let us study the following example to understand this 
concept of fairness. Let r be represented by the following payoff matrix. 
player 2 
fight accommodate 
player 1 fight I 0.01,0.01 6,2 
accommodate ~===2=,6===~=====4=,=4=, ===~ 
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In our model specification, C == fight, D == accommodate, E = 6, e = 4, ex = 
2,{3 = 0.01. The two pure strategy Nash equilibria are (C,D) and (D,C). 
Although in spirit it is a simultaneous move game, consider the following pre-
play thinking on part of the two players. Suppose we are in (C, D). If player 
1 deviates and 'politely' plays D, she sacrifices 2 to benefit player 2 an extra 
amount of 2. This 'nice' choice triggers reciprocal niceness in the behavior 
of player 2 and rather than exploiting over player 1 choosing D, he prefers 
to sacrifice to repay player 1 's kindness and plays D. If player 2 also reasons 
in the same way, (D, D) is the unique outcome and is called the fairness 
equilibrium. Experimental evidence supports the fact that subjects tend 
to play fairness equilibrium strategies in a game of Chicken (see Camerer 
(1997)). 
Proposition 14 If e > (f1~E) > ex and r is game of Chicken, players 
converge to the fairness equilibrium with probability one as A ~ 00. 
Proof. It is easy to see that if the states are arranged in the order 
(D, D), (C, C), (C, D), (D, C), and if e > ({1~E) > et, we have 
and therefore the unique solution to the system FA (( 
desired when A ~ 00 .• 
l)f~ f~ is as 
From the above proposition we see that players converge to the fairness 
equilibrium (D, D) with probability one in the long run if e > (f1~E) > ex. 
Thus in the numerical example above our theory predicts that players will 
converge with probability one to the fairness equilibrium (D, D). This re-
sult also supports in some sense the assumption of Rabin (1993) that utility 
'out of sympathy is outweighed by increased money payoff incentives from 
daring against a chicken which is necessary for the existence of a fairness 
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equilibrium. However, the intuition in our set up is that with unit cognitive 
bounds, since {3+e: < 2e, if we observe the action profile (D, D), players keep 
playing D with very high probabilities which tend to one as their rationality 
tends to infinity. Furthermore, if play ever leads to outcomes like (C, D) or 
(D, C), the player playing D deviates and plays C with very high probability 
while the player playing C keeps playing C with very high probability too. 
This implies that almost certainly, we may observe play of (C, C) in the 
subsequent period. By the definition of the Chicken game, with rationality 
close to infinity, players eventually start playing D with very high proba-
bility. At the limit when the rationality goes to infinity, play gets stuck 
in (D, D). Mention must be made here that in the McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1995) formulation, players always converge to either (C, D) or (D, C). 
Before ending this section, we would like to mention the basic intuition 
by which we claim (without providing formal proofs) that the results for this 
section would actually hold for any finite cognitive bound. As long as players 
are forced to use only most recent and finite history segments as information 
sets for deciding upon the choice probabilities, the above conditions would 
drive them to information sets wherefrom playing the long run outcome is 
enforced with very high probability. The relative weights of payoffs are in 
some sense stability conditions for the dynamic system generated by the 
behavior rules of the players. 
7 A discussion on beliefs without experience 
The results obtained in this paper can be easily supported in spirit in a 
model with general belief-probabilities over outcomes generated by strate-
gies for which players have no experience. In the Prisoners' Dilemma game 
for example, suppose players believe that whenever they have no experi-
ence with a particular strategy, the opponent chooses C with probabil-
ity W E (0,1). Consider a class of games where wa + (1 - w) e < {3 and 
w{3 + (1 - w) e: > e. Then, our theory would predict that players in the long 
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run will play (C, C) with probability one. Similarly, consider another class 
of games where wa+ (1 - w) B > (3 and w(3 + (1 - w) [ < B. Then, our theory 
would predict that players in the long run will play (D, D) with probability 
one. It follows from this discussion that beliefs "on the forgotten path" or 
"off the actual path" of play becomes central. However our aim is not to 
provide a theory as to how such beliefs are formed. One may argue that 
there is some inconsistency or asymmetry in these beliefs as hypothesized 
here in the following sense. It seems that a player's belief regarding whether 
her opponent cooperates or defects depends upon the action the player her-
self chooses to play. For example, if the memory constrained information 
set contains only the outcome (C, C), the player believes that playing C 
results in the outcome (C, C) in the following period with probability one 
(which is possible only if the player believes that her opponent plays C 
with probability one), while playing D results in the outcome (D,C) with 
probability wand the outcome (D, D) with probability 1 - w (which is now 
possible only if the player believes her opponent plays C with probability 
w). Firstly, in logi t models like the one used here, it would be incorrect to 
interpret w in terms of a player's belief regarding what her opponent will 
choose. Rather, it should be thought of as the relative frequency of success 
(which could arise either when both players cooperate or for the player who 
defects when her opponent still cooperates). Clearly then, while confronting 
et strategy either without experience or with forgotten outcomes, w becomes 
arbitrary. Secondly, it is not unknown in social sciences and in particu-
lar in various studies in psychology that perceptions towards risks may be 
different depending upon whether an agent is herself in a cooperative or a 
defective mood. Also, a drastic change in mood of a player within a period 
before an action is actually implemented may disturb the ongoing beliefs 
over outcomes thereby leading to apparent inconsistencies. lO 
IlIr thank Antania Cabrales and Luis Carchan far enlightening me in these issues. 
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8 Conclusion 
'''le conclude with a summary of our results and relevant comparisons with 
the existing literature. We studied infinite repetition of the Prisoners' 
Dilemma. Players were assumed to use a version of Logistic Quantal Re-
sponse Learning behavior. However they face finite cognitive bounds in 
understanding histories of past play. We define two classes of Prisoners' 
Dilemma games: one in which the average defecting payoff is higher than 
the cooperative payoff and the average cooperative payoff is lower than the 
defective payoff; and the other where the average defecting payoff is lower 
than the cooperative payoff and the average cooperative payoff is higher than 
the defective payoff. As the degree of rationality goes to infinity, we show 
that as long as players face finite cognitive bounds, in the former class of 
games, play converges to the static Nash equilibrium which is Pareto dom-
inated while in the latter, play converges to the Pm'eto dominant outcome 
where both players play the cooperative action. As the degree of assumed 
rationality is reduced, the convergence point moves away in both classes of 
games until it hits the centroid of the 3 dimensional unit simplex of prob-
ability distributions over action pairs. Note that there are other classes of 
Prisoners' Dilemmas which do not fall in any of the classes mentioned above. 
However, we show that repetition of any finite game leads to some stationary 
long run distribution over the space of action profiles. Our theory calls for 
experiments where subjects play the Prisoners' Dilemma with an uncertain 
terminal period. One easy way of capturing the notion of cognitive bounds 
in such experimental set up would be to impose time restrictions within 
which subjects need to decide upon their current actions. We then apply 
the results obtained under the general framework to other classes of 2 x 2 
games like Pure Coordination, Common Interest and Chicken. We show 
that as long as players face unit cognitive bounds, under relevant ordinal 
payoff restrictions, play converges to the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium 
in both Pure Coordination and Common Interest games. In case of the 
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Chicken game, we show that players converge to the fairness equilibrium if 
'daring' is not sufficiently rewarding. 
A APPENDIX 
A.1 Results with alternative formulation 
The McKelvey and Palfrey result of convergence of Logit equilibrium to the 
N ash equilibrium when A -+ 00 is proved with the alternative functional 
form of the choice probabilities as in Eq.(7). Here we show that our results 
hold with their formulation as well. In place of Eq.(G) or Eq.(7), consider a 
more general choice probability function 
k( ) _ F(n7(t), A) 
(J i t - -N-"'--"-'-'--'--- (19) 
L F(n7(t), A) 
k=l 
If FC) is continuous and bounded VA E (0, (0) and F(n7(t), A) > 0 V(n7(t), A) E 
lR x (0,00) , then these logistic choice probabilities are well defined. Further-
more, if (F(n7(t),A)/F(n7'(t),A)) -+ 0 as A -+ 00 \vhenever F(n7(t),A) < 
F(nf (t), A), convergence to Nash equilibrium as in l'vIcKelvey and Palfrey 
(1995) is ensured. Thus our formulation as in Eq.(G) guarantees conver-
gence to (D, D) with probability one when ( = 00. As far as our results 
with ( < 00 are concerned, they also hold good with Eq.(7) since our results 
depend on these conditions on F(.) as well. 
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